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Hong Kong’s currency is pegged to the US dollar in a currency board arrangement. In autumn 2003, 
the Hong Kong dollar appreciated from close to 7.80 per US dollar to 7.70, as investors feared that 
the currency board would be abandoned. In the wake of this appreciation, the monetary authorities 
revamped the one-sided currency board mechanism into a symmetric two-sided system with a nar-
row exchange rate band. This paper reviews the characteristics of the new currency board arrange-
ment and embeds a theoretical soft edge target zone model typifying many intermediate regimes, to 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan uutta valuuttakatejärjestelmää (currency board), jonka kautta 
Hongkongin dollari on sidottu Yhdysvaltain dollariin. Sijoittajien pelot valuuttakatejärjestelmän 
purkamisesta johtivat syksyllä 2003 siihen, että Hongkongin dollari vahvistui läheltä tasoa 7,80 ta-
solle 7,70. Vahvistumisen seurauksena rahapolitiikkaviranomaiset muuttivat yksipuolisen valuutta-
katejärjestelmän symmetriseksi kaksipuoliseksi järjestelmäksi, jossa on kapea vaihteluväli. Teoreet-
tinen, reunoiltaan pehmeä (soft edge) valuuttaputkimalli, joka edustaa useaa kiinnitettyjen ja kellu-
vien kurssien väliin jäävää valuuttakurssiregiimiä, selittää valuuttakurssimarkkinoiden rauhallisuut-
ta ja uskottavuutta toukokuun 2005 jälkeen.  
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1  Introduction  
 
Hong Kong´s currency board stands out among such arrangements around the world as the one with 
the longest history.
1
In the present currency board setup, the note-issuing banks deliver to the HKMA an 
equivalent amount of US dollars (USD) as backing for their HKD note issues. The HKMA in turn 
issues certificates of indebtedness denominated in HKD. Similarly, the banks can obtain USD from 
the HKMA by delivering local currency at the fixed exchange rate. Other banks wishing to ex-
change local currency notes can also purchase (or sell) them against equivalent amounts of USD at 
the fixed exchange rate.
 Hong Kong´s currency board was established in 1983 and the Hong Kong dol-
lar (HKD) was pegged to the US dollar (USD) at 7.80 to 1. In September 1998, the rate was 
changed to 7.75 to 1. The exchange rate moved gradually from 7.75 back to 7.80 between April 
1999 and August 2000. The HKD is freely convertible and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA) is responsible for the peg.  
2
Contrary to actively managed fixed exchange rate systems, a currency board system is a 
passive “hard-fixed” peg system. Nonetheless, the HKMA does at times intervene in the foreign 
exchange market to defend the peg. In addition, the HKMA influences interbank liquidity and thus 
short-term inter-bank interest rates. Hong Kong´s currency board has survived a number of booms 
and busts, including a massive speculative attack during Asia´s financial crisis of 1997-98. Given 
the speculative outflow of USD, the HKMA sold large amounts of USD in October 1998 to defend 
the peg. Furthermore, the HKMA pursued a defensive interest rate strategy which was partly re-
sponsible for bringing about a severe recession.
 
3
In light of the fact that exchange rate regimes have been at the centre of academic debate 
and have been a major concern for policymakers in recent years, the paper proceeds as follows. Sec-
tion 2 sheds light on the dynamics of the exchange rate in the period 2001 - 2009 and reviews insti-
tutional features of Hong Kong´s currency board. Section 3 presents the model and its solution. 
  
                                                 
1 Locally, Hong Kong´s currency board system is known as the “linked exchange rate system”. Initially, the currency 
board was adopted as an emergency measure to prevent the HKD from collapsing during a political row between China 
and the United Kingdom in 1983 over the future of the colony. 
2 An in-depth discussion of Hong Kong´s currency board, including documentations on the technical details is available 
at http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/currency/link_ex/index.htm. For a perceptive and thorough discussion, see Latter 
(2007). Most economic policy contributions and discussions on currency board arrangements are based on informal 
analysis devoid of formal economic models. An exception is Chan and Chen (2003). 
3 The result of this surprise move was that interbank interest rates jumped and the overnight rate touched 280 percent. 
This successfully stemmed the speculative outflow of USD. Overnight rates dropped back to about 5 percent within a 
few days. Yu-Fu Chen, Michael Funke and Nicole Glanemann 
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Analytically, the modelling approach lies at the crossroads of the literature on exchange rate target 
zones originated by Krugman (1991) and the literature on currency boards. With the aim of parsi-
mony in mind, but also wanting to ensure a fair degree of reality, we extend and generalize the 
standard target zone model by introducing perceived uncertainty about the edges following the pol-
icy change in May 2005. Section 4 concludes and draws some policy implications. 
 
 
2   Institutional features of Hong Kong´s currency board, 
 2001 - 2009 
 
Despite the presumed rigidity of the currency board system, the convergence between the exchange 
rate in the interbank market and the fixed rate for currency did not happen in practice. Initially, the 
HKMA therefore introduced a wider exchange rate commitment for reserve banks (weak-side Con-
vertibility Undertaking – CU). This was a weak-side commitment in that the HKMA was ready to 
buy unlimited amounts of HKD for USD to prevent a weakening of the currency.
4
 
 This weak-side 
commitment is shown by the red line in Figure 1. 





                                                 
4 In contrast, no strong-side boundary was introduced, i.e. the previous system was asymmetric. While no formal 
strong-side intervention point was introduced, the Subcommittee on Currency Board Operations already considered the 
options in this area in meetings in October 1999 and July 2000 and “agreed that there would be scope to review the ar-
rangement again, should the need arise” [HKMA (2000)]. For a review of the performance of the currency board ar-
rangement after May 2005, see Genberg et al. (2007).  
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Since late 2003, speculative pressure for a revaluation of the Chinese Renminbi has grown, with the 
result of large speculative inflows. The HKD appreciated from 7.80 to 7.70 in autumn 2003, fuel-
ling speculation that the currency board link to the USD might be abandoned.
5
 
 The experience 
shows that a currency board is not a form of magic protection against speculation. Lastly, the link 
was defended with a combination of market interventions, including direct foreign exchange opera-
tions and manipulation of liquidity and interest rates. Over and above these actions, the currency 
board arrangement was again altered on 18 May 2005 when finally a narrow symmetric target zone 
of ±0.6 percent was introduced with a strong-side Convertibility Undertaking (the green line in Fig-
ure 1) at HKD 7.75/USD. For the first time, this added a ceiling to the floor by which it had tradi-
tionally managed the currency, in a move to discourage investors from using the HKD to speculate 
on a RMB appreciation. At the same time, the weak-side CU was changed from HKD 7.80/USD to 
HKD 7.85/USD. These “refinements” were intended to anchor market expectations and promote a 
smooth functioning of the currency board arrangement. Figure 1 shows that the HKD spot rate 
stayed close to the strong-side CU most of the time after May 2005. The validity of the current ar-
rangement has not been called into question by the current financial crisis. 
Figure 2  Daily movements in HKD spot rate and forward rates against USD 
 
Source:
                                                 
5 For the first time, this added a ceiling to the floor by which HKMA had traditionally managed the currency, in a move 
to discourage investors from using the HKD to speculate on RMB appreciation. 
 Bloomberg Yu-Fu Chen, Michael Funke and Nicole Glanemann 
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Time series for the (on-shore) 1-month and 1-year forward exchange rates of the HKD against the 
USD are shown in Figure 2. The chart indicates that prior to autumn 2003 the forward market ex-
pected a depreciation of the HKD (HKD rates were constantly higher than the target rate), which 
never materialized. Since the end of 2003, the forward market has consistently expected – and 
missed - an appreciation of the HKD relative to the USD. The red line for the 1-year forward rate 
indicates that it was far outside the official band in January 2005 and only unhurriedly moved to-
wards the Convertibility Zone afterwards. All in all, the 1-year forward rate of the HKD was consis-
tently outside the convertibility zone between October 2005 and the beginning of 2007. This indi-
cates that financial market participants were initially sceptical about the ability of the new strong-









How can we explain this development? Figure 3 spotlights developments in the 1-year forward ex-
change rate of the HKD versus the non-deliverable 1-year forward exchange rate (NDF) of the 
                                                 
6 If the peg is viewed as irrevocable, the forward premium should be eliminated entirely. As Figure 2 indicates, the for-
ward premium varied significantly over time, reflecting major domestic and international events that impacted Hong 
Kong´s current and/or anticipated economic and financial conditions. This raises the question of the credibility of the 
target zone bands, which has been unduly neglected as an important component of the target zone literature. Schmukler 
and Servén (2002) provide a comprehensive characterisation of the currency premium in Hong Kong. Their estimates 
raise the question of whether Hong Kong´s currency board really has sufficient credibility to minimise exchange rate 
risk.  
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RMB from 2005 to 2009.
7 Until autumn 2006 the 1-year HKD and the appreciating 1-year NDF 
RMB forward rates were parallelly aligned, after which the co-movement disappeared.
8
The perceived credibility issues arising from the new arrangement are modelled in the next 
section of the paper. The resulting setup provides a variation of the standard hard edge target zone 
concept.  
 The inter-
mittent upward pressure on the HKD forward exchange rate was in part the result of strong demand 
for HKD to buy shares on Hong Kong´s stock market. An important factor driving this demand was 
the expectation that the Chinese authorities would allow mainland citizens to invest directly in 
Hong Kong. Belatedly, this reform was deferred indefinitely.  
 
 
3  A soft edge target zone model 
 
Below we rigorously study the perceived credibility issues of an emerging band system in a formal 
model. Our procedure can be regarded as a generalisation of Krugman´s (1991) simple target zone 
model of exchange rates. In the standard model, the peg and the hard edge boundaries are credible, 
and market arbitrage mechanisms and interventions take place in whatever amounts are necessary to 
prevent the band from being violated. In contrast, our model develops the notion that the exchange 
rate band can be seen as a partially credible commitment device. 
In the Hong Kong case, two potential risks may have emerged after May 2005. The first 
was uncertainty about whether the HKMA would honour the peg. For the time being, the Hong 
Kong authorities remain markedly committed to maintaining the existing currency board system.
9
                                                 
7 As is the case with standard forward contracts, NDF exchange rates are fixed for a future date. Thus, the NDF contract 
is similar to a regular forward foreign exchange contract, except that at maturity the NDF is settled in another currency, 
typically the USD, because the domestic currency is subject to capital controls, and is therefore “non-deliverable”. In 
contrast to standard deliverable forwards, NDF´s are traded offshore, i.e. outside the jurisdiction of the authorities of the 
corresponding currency. Trading predominantly takes place in Hong Kong and Singapore and, to a lesser extent, in 
London and Tokyo. The offshore markets offer international investors an otherwise unavailable hedging tool against 
local currency exposure. An analysis of Asian NDF markets as a whole, together with a discussion of the basic institu-
tional features of the renminbi NDF market, is provided by Fung et al. (2004), Ma et al. (2004) and Debelle et al. 
(2006). Ma et al. (2004) and Debelle et al. (2006) discuss the deepening of the Asian NDF markets in recent years. 
 
Though  Hong Kong´s economy has become more closely integrated with that of mainland China 
and it may eventually make sense to replace the USD with the renminbi (RMB) in the peg, this 
8 This point was also raised by Genberg and Hui (2009). 
9 At the end of 2008, Hong Kong´s backing ratio was 109,5%. The backing ratio is defined as the ratio between the 
market value of the backing portfolio and the value of the monetary base. This will make it (almost) feasible to defend 
the preset “Maginot lines” against market pressure. Data are available from the HKMA Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
(http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/public/index.htm). Yu-Fu Chen, Michael Funke and Nicole Glanemann 
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“endgame” is rather unlikely to happen any time soon, owing to China´s closed capital account. 
This makes it technically impossible for Hong Kong to peg its currency to the RMB. In addition, 
given the almost unanimous belief that the RMB will continue to appreciate over the medium term, 
it makes little sense for Hong Kong to fix the HKD to a currency that is expected to rise in value. If 
the RMB rises further, Hong Kong´s economy – particularly the city´s important export sector - will 
become more competitve in the region. Therefore the USD link is unlikely to be abandoned soon. 
The second perceived risk was that the newly introduced symmetric band might be widened in the 
future.
10
Let us first briefly consider the basic Krugman (1991) framework with perfectly known 
and credible bands to gain a benchmark for future analysis.
 In the event of a new exchange rate band, the financial markets may not base their expecta-
tions on a blind faith in the working of the currency board mechanism and the will and commitment 
of the monetary authorities to defend the edges of the band. If the markets can decipher the potential 
fragility of the edges and do the backward induction, a target zone may lose its reputation and stabi-
lising power. Next we concentrate on this second case and discuss the question of perceived soft 
edges in a theoretical framework. 
11
 
 The model starts from the log-linear 
asset pricing equation that expresses the log exchange rate, s, as the sum of the log of the fundamen-
tal, f, and its own expected change: 
(1)   [ ] dt ds E f s λ + = , 
 
where E[⋅] denotes the rational expectations operator, λ > 0, and time subscripts are omitted for 
brevity. The factors affecting the exchange rate are the fundamentals and financial markets’ expec-
tations about the future movement of the exchange rate. It is assumed that the log of the fundamen-
tal follows an arithmetic Brownian motion without drift: 
 
                                                 
10 HKMA would not be the first central bank to do this. For example, in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM), the currencies were initially allowed to fluctuate no more than 2.25 percent above or below fixed bilateral rates. 
The UK joined in 1990 but was forced to leave in 1992 when sterling came under speculative pressure. Fluctuation 
bands were then widened to plus or minus 15 percent in 1993 to avoid defending the indefensible. Likewise, Labhard 
and Wyplosz (1996) have shown that several central banks in the ERM have announced wide exchange rate bands 
while implicitly targeting narrower ones inside. In other words, there was a discrepancy between announced (known) 
and implicit (unknown) bands. 
11 A number of papers have modified and relaxed the assumption of perfectly known bands. Klein (1992), for instance, 
presented a model in which the width of the band is unknown to the public. The dynamics of the exchange rate are 
driven not only by fundamentals but also by expectations with respect to bandwidth. As a consequence, the exchange 
rate will react more sensitively to fundamentals than in Krugman (1991). On the other hand, an intervention reveals the 
true edge of the band. This mechanism stresses the information role of interventions. Klein and Lewis (1993) extended 
the model to the case of stochastic intra-marginal interventions.  
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(2)   dW df σ = , 
 
where σ  is the risk parameter and W denotes a standard Brownian motion. Applying Itô’s lemma to 










+ = . 
 
Krugman (1991) specified the dynamics of f  between two limits. The lower and upper band limits, 
s  and s , result from the intervention obligations within the target zone arrangement. This gives rise 
to a reflected or regulated Brownian motion.
12
The particular solution of equation (1) is as simple as s = f, showing the unregulated exchange rate 
dynamics. The homogeneous solution, 
 
H s , representing the changes in values from the intervention 
of the central bank is  
 
(4)  
f f H e A e A s
β β − + − = 2 1 , 
 
where  σ λ β 2 =  and  1 A  and  2 A  are positive coefficients. The exponential terms  f e A
β
1  and 
f e A
β −
2  cause the bending of the exchange rate function and thus generate the target zone nonlin-
earities. Expressing the exchange rate as an explicit function of the fundamental we obtain the S-
shaped exchange rate function 
 
(5)   f f e A e A f s
β β − + − = 2 1 , 
 
which is the general solution of the form for exchange rates. The band edges come from the two 
value-matching conditions: 
 
(6)   12
ff s f Ae Ae
ββ − = −+  
 
                                                 
12 Some papers have endogenised exchange rate policy by deriving the width of the band as a rational choice of an op-
timising central bank. For example, Cukierman et al. (1994) model the choice of bandwidth as a choice between flexi-
bility in responding to external shocks and commitment to less devaluation and inflation. Yu-Fu Chen, Michael Funke and Nicole Glanemann 
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(7)   12
ff s f Ae Ae
ββ − = −+ . 
 
where for s  and  s are strong and weaker band exchange rates and  f  and  f are the levels of fun-
damentals as the edges of the bands are approached. The no-expected-arbitrage-profits conditions 
imply the following two smooth-pasting conditions, which require that the exchange rate function is 
flat at the edges: 
 
(8)   12 01
ff Ae Ae
ββ ββ
− = −−  
 
(9)   12 01
ff Ae Ae
ββ ββ
− = −−  
 
Equations (6) – (9) enable determination of the two constants of integration,  1 A  and  2 A , which 
completely solves the model.
13 f  After obtaining  ,  f ,  1 A  and  2 A , a S-shaped curve can be obtained 
from equation (5).  
In the original Krugman (1991) model, the reduced form relationship between exchange rates and 
fundamentals is driven by the perfectly known and credible bands. Conversely, what happens when 
the relationship is driven not by the band itself but by expectations regarding the band? How can we 
model perceived uncertainty of market participants as to the currency board arrangement and Hong 
Kong´s monetary authorities’ determination to defend the newly introduced symmetric bands? To 
keep the story tractable, the soft edge band is assumed to consist of two components: the announced 
edges  s and  s , and a normally distributed noise term.
14 In normal times, the noise term is small and 
the self-adjusting autopilot function of the currency board system is expected to behave properly, 
i.e. endogenous market forces stabilise the exchange rate without any need for intervention.
15
                                                 
13 Advocates of models with endogenous realignment risks argue that a high risk of realignment can reverse the S-type 
effect that the target zone has on the exchange rate [Bertola and Caballero (1992), Bertola and Svensson (1993)].  
 But in 
14 Reality is more complicated, as usual. It is possible to assume more complicated sets of assumptions in our model, 
such as private sector expectations on capital inflow shocks and posterior updates based on realisations, but we believe 
that our simple approach is an adequate and tractable representation of the situation. Another alternative would be to use 
a distribution with fatter-than-normal tails, which would imply a more bimodal pattern. Yet we stay with our approach, 
given the disappointing empirical record of structural exchange rate models and that our approach does not require im-
position of excessive structure. 
15 The stabilising effect of a currency board arrangement is entirely different from a target zone system. A currency 
board issues currency notes with 100 percent foreign reserves backing at a fixed exchange rate. This represents a strong 
commitment to economic discipline. Any holder of paper money therefore rests assured that she can exchange her notes 
for foreign currency at the fixed rate. Since the exchange rate of paper money is fixed, so too must be the exchange rate 
for bank deposits. Any rate differential leads to profitable cash arbitrage, which closes the gap. If the prices of the same 
product in two sub-markets differ from each other, one can buy the product in the lower-price sub-market and sell it at a  
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noisy times, when confidence is fragile, capital inflows may cause a crisis of confidence that sets 
off massive capital flows. In other words, we replace the perfectly known and credible symmetric 
band [s , s ] by [ ( )
2 , s Ns σ , ( )
2 , s Ns σ ] and we analyse how the uncertainty as to the band feeds 
back into the dynamics of the exchange rate. The variance σ
2
s  reflects the degree of confidence 
market participants have in the band given the economy´s current and expected fundamentals. 
 To keep the exchange rate within the symmetric band [ ( )
2 , s Ns σ , ( )
2 , s Ns σ ], it is suffi-
cient to confine the fundamental process to [  ( )
2 , s Nf σ ,  ( )
2 , s Nf σ ] at both ends. By taking expec-
tations conditional on the information of  f ,  f
2 , and  s σ , we obtain the following perceived value-
matching conditions for the soft edge model, as shown in the Appendix: 
   


















E s s E f Ae Ae f
s f Ae Ae
s f v Ae Ae e
ββ





























E s s E f Ae Ae f
s f Ae Ae
s f Ae Ae e
ββ











The corresponding smooth-pasting conditions are 
 



















                                                                                                                                                                  
higher price in the other, gaining a profit at zero risk. As many market participants would engage in similar arbitrage, 
the two prices should equalize, provided transaction costs are negligible. The second market arbitrage mechanism is 
interest arbitrage. For example, if there is speculation against the currency, funds will flow out of the economy and do-
mestic interest rates will rise. This should reverse the outflow and stabilise the exchange rate. Both market arbitrage 
mechanisms can be classified as self-reversing market movements and represent the self-adjusting “autopilot” of a cur-
rency board arrangement. It is like the honeymoon effect in a fully credible target zone, but it is driven by arbitrage dis-
couraging the exchange rate from straying outside of the band. Yu-Fu Chen, Michael Funke and Nicole Glanemann 
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Next we study the properties of this model. The key difference between the solution for a fully 
credible hard band and a perceived soft edge band is that the values of  1 A  and  2 A  are scaled down 
by a factor of 
22 2 1
s e
βσ > . While a unique exchange rate is defined as a function of the fundamentals 
for the traditional (credible) target zone, a family of such curves is defined for the perceived soft 
target zone. Figure 4 portrays the features of the exchange rates versus fundamentals of the models 






































Note: ( ) ln 7.85 s =  Benchmark values are σ = 0.03,   , ( ) ln 7.75 s = , and  9 . 0 = λ . 
 
Several properties of the solution are apparent from Figure 4. First, the resulting dynamics of the 
exchange rate are again S-shaped. In the fully credible target zone solution (σs = 0), the exchange 
rate is stabilised at the edges [ ( ) ln 7.75 s =  and  ( ) ln 7.85 s = ]. Second, for perceived soft edges (σs 
> 0), the resulting S-shaped curve is a monotonically increasing function of the standard deviation. 
The other way round, the moderating effect is the stronger, the better the reputation of the policy-
maker. Third, while all curves are almost identical near s = ln (7.80), the soft band curves become 
steeper than the hard band curve as the exchange rate approaches the edges. Hence, soft edge bands 
lead to weaker honeymoon effects and wider target zone ranges.  
It makes sense to assume that the longer the exchange rate complies with the pre-announced band, 
the more the announcement is believed. As a result, the commitment grows stronger and more 
                                                 
16 We are well aware of the stylised nature of the model, despite our attempts to calibrate with realistic parameters. We 
do not claim empirical accuracy for the model but use it rather for qualitative features and predictions.  
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− , where η > 0 denotes the credibility convergence speed.
17
s s s ≥ ≥
 In other words, the 
dynamics causing the effective width of the target zone evolve over time as long as  . By 
modelling the time-varying nature of the variance, we approximate the current configuration in 
Hong Kong. 
It is straightforward to verify that by taking expectations we obtain the following equations describ-
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The associated smooth pasting conditions are given by 
 






















where  f  and  f are again the upper and lower values of the fundamentals corresponding to the up-
per and lower bounds of the target zone, respectively. A numerical solution is shown in Figure 5. 
 
                                                 
17 Here we can conveniently assume that the time-dependent exogenous variances do not affect the Bellman equation 
(3), as they are exogenous to market participants. Yu-Fu Chen, Michael Funke and Nicole Glanemann 
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 Parameters of the model are η = 4. Curves are drawn for t = 50, t = 100 and t = 250 days. 
The situation portrayed in Figure 5 resembles that in Figure 4. The dynamics cause the width of the 






4  Summary and conclusions 
 
Over the last decade, central banks have implemented new breeds of target zone exchange rate re-
gimes. In Hong Kong, a symmetric band forming upper and lower limits for HKD fluctuations 
around the central parity was adopted in May 2005, as an integral part of the currency board regime. 
An interesting feature of Hong Kong´s currency board arrangement is the important achievement of 
speculative peace and credibility after the turbulent year 2003.
19 Thus, the formal shift to a very nar-
row target zone of ±0.6 percent in May 2005 has so far helped in ending, mitigating, and preventing 
excessive speculative pressure.
20
                                                 
18 An interesting alternative to our modelling approach with oscillating band widths over time has recently been pre-
sented by Dibeh (2006).   
  
19 However, in October 2007 strong upward pressure on the HKD put the future of the currency board again in the spot-
light, and HKMA was forced to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to prevent the rate from breaching the nar-
row band. This represented the first such intervention by the HKMA in more than two years. 
20 Cautionary note: the current stability may be coincidental and caused by the current undervaluation of the HKD. In 
spring 2009 the HKD turned out to be 52 percent undervalued by the Economist Big Max burger gauge. The Big Max 
index is a light-hearted PPP measure of currencies (see The Economist, 18 July 2009, p. 66).  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 21/ 2009 
 
 
  17 
On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Hong Kong´s return to China, Time (2007) magazine 
ran a cover story on Hong Kong entitled “Sunshine with Clouds, 1997 - 2007”. In close analogy to 
the title, we summarise the recent performance of the HKD – USD peg as “Mostly Sunshine with 
Occasional Clouds, 2005 – 2009”. Going from specifics to generalisations, one can perhaps now 
conclude that narrow bands may experience an unanticipated comeback in conjunction with cur-
rency board arrangements. 
This experience is diametrically opposed to the ERM experience in the 1990s. Speculative 
attacks on the French Franc led to the so-called Brussels Compromise in August 1993, which led to 
much wider fluctuation bands of ±15 percent (“soft buffers”). By dropping the commitment to keep 
the exchange rate within a narrow band, ERM central banks have thwarted one-way bets and specu-
lative spurts [Batolini and Prati (1993, 1997) and Labhard and Wyplosz (1996)].
21
For our modelling framework we have demonstrated that a narrow target zone may remain 
a stabilising instrument even under noisy expectations. Clearly, this sort of analysis is only a first 
step. Nevertheless, the analysis may lead to enhanced understanding of the great resilience to specu-
lative pressure of Hong Kong´s tight ±0.6 percent target zone since May 2005.
  
22
                                                 
21 Actually, the ERM policy approach since August 1993 may be interpreted as a managed-float regime in which central 
banks had intervened with increasing intensity as the exchange rates departed from central parities, but without com-
mitment to an explicit narrow band.   
 
22 Whereas this paper focuses on exchange rate dynamics, other aspects, such as optimal band width are left to future 
research. Some papers have endogenised exchange rate policy by deriving the width of the band as a rational choice of 
an optimising central bank. For example, Cukierman et al. (1994) model the choice of  band width as a choice between 
flexibility in responding to external shocks and commitment to less devaluation and inflation. Yu-Fu Chen, Michael Funke and Nicole Glanemann 
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Appendix  
Derivation of equations (10) and (11) 
 
Despite its conceptual simplicity, the model is rather tedious to solve. Below we give the details of 
the solution. The derivation of (10) and (11) can be explained as follows. Taking expectations of 
equation (5) with  ( )
2 , s Nf σ , we obtain 
 


















−∞  = = + −+  ∫ . 
 
Removing all constant parameters from the integral yields 
 
(A2) 














−∞ −∞ =−+ ∫∫ . 
 
The next step is to obtain expressions for the integrals on the right-hand side of (A2). By expanding 
( )
2





















−∞ −∞ = ∫∫ .  
 
Completing a square of  ( ) ( )
2
2
s ff βσ −+  gives 
 
(A4) 
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Note that the integral 

















−∞ ∫  is the expectation of normal distribution with mean 
2
s f βσ +  and variance 
2
s σ , and equals one. Thus the preceding expression simplifies to  
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After plugging in (A5) - (A6) and rearranging, we finally obtain equation (10) in the text: 
 




s E s s s f Ae Ae
β βσ β βσ
σ
+ −−
 = = −+   
 
In the same vein, equation (11) can be obtained. Taking expectations of equation (11) in the text 
with  ( )
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Following the above simplifying procedure, we obtain 
 




s f Ae Ae
β βσ β βσ + −−
= −+ , 
 
which concludes the derivation. Yu-Fu Chen, Michael Funke and Nicole Glanemann 
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